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CAPS (BRS) Pin In Place


FastEddieB

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Long thread on COPA about an accident in Tallahassee, FL back on 11/13/2008, and a subsequent lawsuit against Sandel.

 

I'll link to the NTSB report* later, but this was heartbreaking:

 

16409355646_e52f67a8db_z.jpg

 

Can't say if it was a training deficiency or a lack of checklist discipline or something else, but its still sad.

 

 

*What I have right now is the Docket, where the photo came from: http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hitlist.cfm?docketID=47979&CFID=453763&CFTOKEN=77815656

 

NTSB report: https://ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief2.aspx?ev_id=20081113X13150&ntsbno=ERA09FA053&akey=1

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That is sad.  I keep the safety pin on the ignition switch keychain.  I also brief passengers on how it works and I do a mental briefing before I take the runway.  No sense hauling that thing around if you're not ready to use it.

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Having a safety system in place is worthless if you're not trained to use it in an emergency.

 

As an aside, this same post has generated thoughtful discussion on two other forums.

 

No one else needed clarification on what the point was.

 

There it is...who cares what other forums talk about?    I see pushback and ridicule made of the parachute on other forums routinely.  When this forum had a discussion on the topic it was well covered.  Frankly, I thought your post was obscure and unfocused.  So I will join in the refrain....what IS your point?

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What was the lawsuit about ?

I believe they convinced the jury that there were failure modes of the Sandel HSI that could lead to erroneous indications with no warning flag, and that that could have led to the disorientation which was the proximate cause of the accident.

 

But don't shoot the messenger - I'm just saying that the plaintiffs won and my sketchy understanding of the reasons. It's all at least third hand information, so please take it with a grain of salt.

 

Here's a simulator video, which I think was prepared by the plaintiff's attorneys:

 

 

Just watched it. DAMN!

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About that video...

 

1) I think there's a lot of speculation in it. It's what might have happened with the Sandel, not necessarily what did happen.

 

2) So many opportunities to break that chain.

 

3) Low time pilots and VFR-only pilots may enjoy sniping at this pilot. Until you feel the primal grip of spatial disorientation, it's almost impossible to relate to.

 

4) Had the pilot pulled, I guarantee he would have been called an idiot by some. But a live idiot.

 

5) I actually felt a little ill after watching that.

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Having a safety system in place is worthless if you're not trained to use it in an emergency.

 

As an aside, this same post has generated thoughtful discussion on two other forums.

 

No one else needed clarification on what the point was.

I still need clarification on the point. I read the NTSB report twice and tried to place myself in the pilot's seat. This guy messes up an instrument approach, continually fails to respond appropriately to ATC, and ends descending through a 1500' overcast and through a 400' broken layer. Less than a minute after his last transmission, which might be construed to be initiating a missed approach, he has according to witnesses spun in.

 

The overcast was 1500', broken 400', about 150' above DA. ATC never calls an altitude so we aren't sure if he ever picked up the glide slope, although radar returns should give a clue. We know he was right of the localizer and continuing to the right. It's almost as if he input the reverse wind correction angle. He sounds confused. Radar would also have given some sense of ground speed and, together with wind speed, we should have a clue as to what air speed he was flying.

 

This guy's out was to declare a missed approach and try another or go to a different airport. When was he to pull the CAPS? At what altitude did he enter the spin? Did he identify it as a spin promptly?

 

I don't see this as a case where CAPS was the solution to a pilot who appears to be confused and behind the airplane in the first place. His out was to fly a missed approach.

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I would like to think that as soon as the Sandel and MFD malfunctioned (if they did) I would have confirmed that my attitude indicator, turn coordinator and airspeed agreed with each other and initiated a wings level best rate climb. This is Tallahassee, after all, so terrain, at least, is not an issue -though towers might be. Gain some altitude, calm down and try to sort things out.

 

Cover or dim the Sandel and MFD, and the VOR head and compass together with the other gyro instruments should suffice for a properly trained instrument pilot.

 

Then again, I've felt the icy grip of incipient spatial disorientation and it can be very, very hard to think clearly.

 

We have had more than a few episodes of spatial disorientation reported in Cirrus aircraft. A few pilots pulled. They all survived*.

 

A few did not pull. They are all dead, as far as I know, along with their passengers. Including this one.

 

Had this fellow had the pin out and pulled as soon as things started to go downhill, he'd almost certainly be alive today. And able to stand up to those who would inevitably rush to call him an idiot and criticize his pulling "too soon".

 

But the pin found in place probably shows the chute probably never even crossed his mind. It happens. My simulator exercise is proof of that.

 

*Including the fellow who got spatially disoriented, pulled, and had the chute fail to deploy. One lucky SOB who did manage to recover after all that and land with the bagged chute still in tow!

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As soon as the HSI went wonky and the display followed, I started sweating while watching this. Took me a moment to focus on the instruments that are functional.

 

Also: it doesn't matter who is right or wrong. If an accident happens and it goes to court, the company always loses because of sympathetic juries.

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I may have told this before, but...

 

I was mostly a Florida pilot, so in spite of being an instrument instructor I did not have a whole lot of experience with low overcasts.

 

And leaving Copperhill, TN in my Tiger one day, there was a very low overcast - 100' or so.

 

Copperhill is about 1,800 msl. There's 3,000' plus terrain in various quadrants. Got my clearance, and the plan was to take off on RWY2, climb straight ahead, make a 180° left turn to 200° to stay away from terrain, then climb to 4,000' before going direct HRS VOR.

 

This may help with the lay of the land (Copperhill is 1A3):

 

16413922506_76e3162952_z.jpg

 

Took off, climbed into the soup, and began a standard rate turn to the left. Standard rate: check. Airspeed: check. Attitude: check. Heading: I'M STILL ON 020°!!! WHY AM I NOT TURNING???

 

I did what I proposed in my prior post. Wings level on attitude indicator, best rate on whatever heading I was really on, try to figure things out.

 

I did fairly quickly. My compass and heading indicator disagreed. When I went to sync them, the problem was obvious: my little Tiger was not used to cold weather and when I had pushed in the setting knob on the Heading Indicator on the ground it had not popped back out, caging the Heading Indicator.

 

I relate this to show how one little thing can turn your world quite upside down - almost literally. When stuff starts not agreeing in the soup, it can be frightening and disorienting and that fear can make rational thought very difficult.

 

Anyway, that episode made me much more empathetic to reports of spatial disorientation - I can see how quickly it can strike and how scary it is.

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Had 25 years teaching in simulators. Saw this type confusion many times.  Bottom line here is he got way behind the power curve and did not follow the basic rule of IFR flight.  Full deflection of on course needles or glide slope - GO AROUND - immediately.  Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.  He should never have gotten to the chute controversy point.  He was so far behind the airplane starting at the pre flight when the BRS pin should have been removed, that you would not expect him to perform a chute pull during the last few critical moments.

 

I wonder how much actual IFR he had in the recent past. 

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Had 25 years teaching in simulators. Saw this type confusion many times.  Bottom line here is he got way behind the power curve and did not follow the basic rule of IFR flight.  Full deflection of on course needles or glide slope - GO AROUND - immediately.  Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.  He should never have gotten to the chute controversy point.  He was so far behind the airplane starting at the pre flight when the BRS pin should have been removed, that you would not expect him to perform a chute pull during the last few critical moments.

 

Spot on Duane.

Pegged needles, either one, automatic go-around.  Try it again (if fuel/wx permits).

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In this case, if he had no good diverts he could try it until he was out of gas and then use the chute.

Andy,

 

If he had no good diverts, then he was still behind from the beginning because proper planning dictates that he must plan for a good alternate with FAA reserves.  I don't know the whole story but I am pretty sure he was behind in planning and flying all the way.

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