A (Cautionary) Tale Of Two Landing Accidents

[FastEddieB]

Every Private Pilot Applicant is held to this standard on his or her checkride:

 

8. Touches down smoothly at approximate stalling speed (ASEL). (verbatim from the PTS)

 

Roger quibbled that "approximate" gave wiggle room to the upside.

 

Maybe.

 

But a student who is trained to land at stall speed who has an off day and lands maybe 5k above will almost certainly pass a checkride.

 

Then again, a student who is trained to land at stall speed +5 who has an off day and lands +10 may be deemed by the examiner not to have shown the ability to land at the approximate stall speed, and may end up with a pink slip.

 

I have about 4,500 hours logged as an instuctor. Probably about half of my 1,500 hours tailwheel time was instructing from the back seat of one of my two Citabrias.

 

I've taught every primary student (including one in a Citabria) to aim for a full stall landing, conditions permitting.

 

I've never had a student fail the flight portion of a checkride*.

 

Once certified, pilots are free to fly to standards below the minimums prescribed in the Practical Test Standards. but for one shining moment, a Private Pilot Applicant is required to show the ability to land at approximately stall speed. And maybe, just maybe, there's a reason the FAA sees fit to require that.

 

Just sayin'.

 

 

 

* my only busts both happened in the oral phase.

[Admin2]

Hi Gentlemen,

 

Personal attacks and derogatory commentary is about to shut this post down and let it start fresh. Oral debate, differences of opinions and different techniques are all fine, but some of the language is not. Please clean it up. I ask once now twice.

I'm going to adopt the California three strike rule.

 

There is a lot of good info in these threads PLEASE don't be the cause of loosing it.

[FastEddieB]

Thanks for the warning.

 

As the initiator of this thread, I would hate to see it taken down as I agree there's value to be had from the discussion.

 

I just read back through the entire thread, and don't see much in the way of personal attacks or derogatory commentary, certainly not in the last several posts.

 

Have some of the problem posts already been excised? If not, I'm just not seeing the proximate cause for the warning.

[Tom Baker]

gbigs, across the fence at 62 doesn't tell us at what speed you are landing. What speed do you touch down at?

[Ed Cesnalis]

gbigs,

 

Actually you advocate 62 over the runway, or numbers or threshold, not over the fence. What altitude do you normally cross the numbers at?

 

If we look at FastEddies landing video AGAIN we see him cross the numbers at what looks like just a few feet, in that case I see more need for 1.2 - 1.3 VSo but if you are still high and haven't rounded out yet its not as bad.

 

I assume you enter your round out at 62, what speed to you touch down at and what height do you round out at?

[FastEddieB]

Here's that video truncated to the last landing.

 

 

(best viewed in HD/full screen)

 

I seem to be approaching at 60k. 39k x 1.3 = 51k, so I'm carrying a bit of extra speed on final. I've always denied being an "airspeed Nazi", and this is a good example of that.

 

But watch the airspeed in the roundout. It goes smoothly from 60k to about 45k as I arrive at the flare. That's what the roundout is supposed to accomplish. As such, there's minimum float as I hold off and seem to touch down at about 37k indicated - below the bottom of the white arc, but truth be told I could have still held it off a tiny bit longer (look at the stick and see it still has a bit to go).

 

Anyway, that's how I attempt to land at the lowest possible speed, conditions permitting. I certainly am capable of "flying it on" at higher speeds, but remain to be convinced that that would enhance safety in any way.

 

One other note: watch what I do after the landing. Flaps stay set at 30º, boost pump stays on, landing light stays on, transponder stays on. There's ZERO need to futz with things until clear of the active, and its a good habit to try to form.

[sandpiper]

Did a Flight Review for a guy in a Maule today. He keeps his plane on a short farm strip so for him every landing is a perfect 3 point usually with tail wheel contacting first. He's so used to that I had trouble getting him to do wheelies!

[FastEddieB]

Did a Flight Review for a guy in a Maule today. He keeps his plane on a short farm strip so for him every landing is a perfect 3 point usually with tail wheel contacting first.

 

I think I mentioned in another thread the very slowest and least exciting Citabria landings had the tailwheel roll on right before the mains plotzed down a few inches, the thump indicating the plane was done flying. I would have students visualize that and feel for the runway with the tail, not really concerned about what the mains were doing, but just rolling the tailwheel on.

 

I had one primary student in a Citabria. Did a great job and now flies a Mooney. It was unusual checking him out in a Cessna after all those tailwheel hours, and it felt really weird for him. I still hold that learning in a tailwheel, either initially or down the road, enhances a pilot's feel for the "proper" landing stance.

[Mac Bowden]

As some of you are aware, over on this side of the Ocean we operate out of some very short farm strips and aim to land with very little energy left. I usually aim for about 45-47 knots over the hedge which can be about 30mtrs to the threshold and stop in another 80mtrs or so. I must admit it is nice to land at some of the commercial airports and enjoy flying it on and floating down a long runway for the sheer joy of tickling the tarmac.

Check out this video and see how the pros do it.......

 

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=20a_1355531018

 

[Ed Cesnalis]

Thank you Mac!

 

The distance that you routinely land in is amazing. The descent and landing in the video are amazing too.

[WmInce]

Check out this video and see how the pros do it.......

 

The steep left turn to very short final was dangerous. Nothing "professional" about that, just a cowboy showing off.

What that pilot was doing is nothing to aspire to.

[Duane Jefts]

I would recommend taking the stuffed animal down from the compass or whatever its hanging on, to add to flight visibility and traffic avoidance.

 

I agree with Wm.Ince - this is no way to fly an airplane and not appropriate to display to some of the less experienced pilots on this forum.

 

Having said that, I must admit that was a skillful maneuver - just not appropriate.

[WmInce]

. . . "The only comment on this idiotic manuever is that its what it appears to be, dangerous, unsafe, and mostly a penis move." . . .

 

I must have come from a very sheltered life, because I have never heard of the aviation term, "penis move."

Just for my own edification . . . can you please explain what you meant by that? :huh:

[FredG]

On Jan 6, 2013, Paul Bertorelli wrote a Blog on this video (and the flying depicted in it) on AvWeb.com entitled "Should We Have Published This Video". Interesting read.

Fred

[WmInce]

On Jan 6, 2013, Paul Bertorelli wrote a Blog on this video (and the flying depicted in it) on AvWeb.com entitled "Should We Have Published This Video". Interesting read.

Fred

 

Concur.

[CT4ME]

I can't say exactly what a p*nis move is... but guess it's related to the "watch this" move... often followed by a crunching sound...

tim

[Dan Kent]

There's also a version that goes: "hold my beer and watch this".

[Jim]

He's a skydive jump pilot. Whydidntchasayso...

[FastEddieB]

Over on the Cirrus Owner's website we just got a final report on a Cirrus landing fatal.

 

Here's the text. I'll post my comments to follow.

 

ERA12FA303

HISTORY OF FLIGHT

 

On April 27, 2012, about 1256 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp. SR22, N154CK, was substantially damaged when it impacted terrain shortly after takeoff from Anderson Regional Airport (AND), Anderson, South Carolina. The private pilot/owner was fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan was filed for the flight. The local personal flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

 

The pilot's flight instructor, and close friend, recounted the events that transpired prior to and during the accident flight. According to the flight instructor, he had been providing the pilot with flight instruction toward his instrument rating in the weeks preceding the accident flight. The purpose of the flight on the day of the accident was to practice flying under visual flight rules. The flight originated at Greenville Downtown Airport (GMU), Greenville, South Carolina about 1000, and they proceeded to Oconee County Airport (CEU), Clemson, South Carolina, where the pilot performed 1 full stop practice landing, then departed for AND. The flight instructor then monitored the pilot as he performed about 6 or 7 practice takeoffs and landings, all of which terminated in a full stop and taxi back to runway 23. The pilot then taxied the airplane to the fixed base operator (FBO), where the flight instructor disembarked and told the pilot to perform 3 additional practice takeoffs and landings.

 

The pilot's first solo takeoff and landing appeared normal, and after the landing the pilot taxied the airplane back to the beginning of the runway before initiating the takeoff, as he had done previously with the flight instructor aboard. During the second circuit, the flight instructor observed the airplane's landing light on final approach to the runway. The airplane appeared to land normally, touching down within the first 10 to 15 percent of the runway. Expecting the airplane to continue down the runway and exit on a taxiway, he was surprised when he saw the landing light begin to ascend. As it approached, he could see that the airplane had pitched upward steeply, to an angle of about 40 degrees. The airplane climbed in that attitude until the left wing suddenly dropped, similar in appearance to an aerodynamic stall. The airplane then descended in a steep, nose-down attitude until the he lost sight of it behind sloping terrain southeast of runway 23.

 

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

 

The pilot, age 58, held a private pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land. According to his Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman file, the pilot was issued a Notice of Disapproval of Application following unsatisfactory performance of the practical portion of his private pilot certificate practical evaluation on November 14, 2009. The pilot was subsequently re-examined on Area of Operation IV, Tasks D and F (Soft-Field Approach and Landing and Short-Field Approach and Landing), and issued a private pilot certificate on November 28, 2009. The pilot’s most recent FAA third-class medical certificate was issued on July 22, 2010, with the limitation “Must have available glasses for near vision.”

 

Review of the pilot’s personal flight log showed that he began flight training in July 2008. He accumulated 113 total hours of flight experience between that time and the time he earned his private pilot certificate. All but 16 of those hours were completed in Cessna 172 airplanes. In December 2009, the pilot purchased the accident airplane, and since that time, the pilot had accumulated 226 additional hours of flight experience. Additionally, all of the flight experience the pilot had accumulated since that time were logged as either dual flight instruction, or logged with a flight instructor signoff.

 

 

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

 

The weather conditions reported at AND, at 1256, included clear skies, visibility 10 statute miles, winds from 265 degrees magnetic at 9 knots, temperature 26 degrees Celsius ©, dew point 17 degrees C, and an altimeter setting of 30.02 inches of mercury. The calculated wind components for runway 23 included a headwind of 7 knots and a right crosswind of 5 knots.

 

AIRPORT IN FORMATION

 

The Anderson Regional airport was comprised of intersecting runways configured in a 5/23 and 17/35 orientation. Runway 23 was 6,002 feet long by 149 feet wide, was aligned on a heading of 231 degrees magnetic, and was equipped with a 4-light precision approach path indicator. A parallel taxiway was present on the northwest side of the runway, and the runway intersected runway 17/35 about 3,200 feet beyond the approach threshold. The airport elevation was 782 feet.

 

FLIGHT RECORDERS

 

Recoverable Data Module (RDM)

 

A crash-hardened flight data recording device was installed in the vertical stabilizer of the accident airplane, and was recovered from the airplane at the accident site. The RDM recorded numerous flight parameters at a rate of 1 Hz. Data from the RDM were downloaded without incident, and about 145 hours of flight time were present. The data contained the entirety of the accident flight. All altitudes given below are pressure altitudes recorded by the RDM, unless otherwise stated.

 

The details of the accident flight recorded by the RDM were consistent with the recount of events provided by the flight instructor. As the airplane was on final approach to runway 23, the flaps were fully extended, the airspeed varied between 91 and 99 knots, and the descent rate varied between 1,120 feet per minute and 688 feet per minute. During the final approach, the engine power generally decreased from about 32 percent power to 25 percent as the airplane crossed the runway threshold, at 1255:44.

 

The airplane continued to descend over the next 11 seconds until reaching a low altitude of 742 feet, about 1,700 feet beyond the runway threshold. During that time, the pitch remained relatively stable until 1255:54, when it began to increase, and the stall warning activated 1 second later. At 1255:56, the engine power began increasing and 3 seconds later, the flap position switch transitioned from the down to the up position as the pitch continued to increase to a maximum of 13 degrees nose up. Over the next several seconds, the airplane began turning left and had departed the left lateral boundary of the runway by 1256:01. By 1256:03, the engine power had reached 101 percent, the stall warning remained active, the heading had drifted left from 234 degrees to 208 degrees, the pitch had increased to a maximum of 15 degrees nose up, and the airplane had climbed 75 feet.

 

The final data point was recorded at 1256:05. At that time, the airplane’s pressure altitude was 825 feet (about 50 feet above ground level), the heading was 177 degrees, the pitch was 3 degrees nose up, the roll was 57 degrees left wing down, the airspeed was 70 knots, the stall warning was active, the flaps were retracted, and the engine power was at 98 percent. The airplane was 167 feet left of the runway boundary at that point.

 

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

 

The initial impact point (IIP) was located about 250 feet from the left edge of runway 23, at a point about 2,730 feet from the runway threshold. The IIP was located about 128 feet south of the airplane’s final RDM recorded position, on a 180-degree magnetic bearing. The IIP consisted of a 1.5-foot-deep crater that was 7 feet long by 5 feet wide. Located within the crater were two of the three composite propeller blades, which had separated at the propeller hub. An approximate 50-foot wreckage path, oriented about 160 degrees magnetic, led from the initial impact point to the main wreckage. Along the wreckage path were broken pieces of the engine cowling and windscreen. The main wreckage was oriented roughly 330 degrees magnetic, and consisted of the fuselage, wings, and empennage. The fuselage and right wing were almost completely consumed by a post-impact fire.

 

The fuselage, including the instrument panel, cabin, baggage compartment, and right wing, was nearly consumed by the post-impact fire. The left wing and empennage remained relatively intact.

 

Flight control continuity was confirmed from the rudder, elevator, and left aileron control surfaces to the cabin area; however, due to the extent of thermal damage, control continuity for the right aileron could not be confirmed. Measurement of the flap actuator correlated to the flaps being retracted at impact. The pitch and roll trim motors were found positioned near neutral trim positions.

 

The fuel selector was found set to the left main fuel tank position, and during the wreckage recovery about 15 gallons of fuel was recovered from the left wing fuel tank. The standby attitude indicator was recovered displaying a wings-level inverted attitude. No other flight instrument or switch positions could be discerned due to the extent of the post-impact fire damage.

 

The whole-airframe parachute system activation handle was located within its holder, with the safety pin removed. The parachute remained packed and was thermally damaged. The parachute system enclosure cover was found 10 feet to the right of the wreckage. Both reefing line cutters were found expended and had their ignition loops in place. The rocket motor, pick-up collar, lanyards, and incremental bridle were not located within the wreckage.

 

The engine remained attached to the firewall via various hoses, cables, and wires. Continuity of the valvetrain and powertrain were confirmed through rotation of the propeller. Compression was observed on all cylinders except number 5. Borescope examination of the cylinder revealed the presence of ingested dirt underneath both the intake and exhaust valve heads. Examination of both turbochargers revealed the presence of ingested dirt, though both remained free to rotate. The fuel pump input drive rotated freely by hand and its input driveshaft was intact. Rotation of both magneto drives produced spark at all terminal leads.

 

Two of the three propeller blades had separated from their respective hub sockets, and were recovered from within the initial impact point.

 

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

 

An autopsy was performed on the pilot by the Anderson County Coroner, Anderson, South Carolina. The stated cause of death was "blunt force trauma."

 

The FAA's Bioaeronautical Sciences Research Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicological testing on samples of the pilot’s blood, urine, and vitreous. No carbon monoxide or cyanide was detected in the blood sample. No ethanol was detected in the vitreous sample. Ranitidine and Tamsulosin were detected in samples of blood and urine. Diphenhydramine, Ibuprofen, Nadolol, Quinine, and Tetrahydrozoline were only detected in the pilot’s urine.

 

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

 

According to the airframe manufacturer’s Pilot’s Operating Handbook, at the airplane’s maximum gross weight and most forward center of gravity, with 0 degrees of bank, the indicated stall speed was 73 knots with the flaps retracted and 62 knots with the flaps fully extended.

 

The manufacturer’s “Balked Landing/Go-Around” procedure stated in part, “…apply full power, then reduce the flap setting to 50%. If obstacles must be cleared during the go around, climb at 75-80 [knots indicated airspeed] with 50% flaps. After clearing any obstacles, retract the flaps and accelerate to the normal flaps up climb speed.”

 

Review of guidance provided by the airframe manufacturer for deployment of the whole-airframe parachute system showed that, “Altitude loss from level flight deployments has been demonstrated at less than 400 feet. With these numbers in mind it might be useful to keep 2,000 feet AGL [above ground level] in mind as a cut-off decision altitude. Above 2,000 feet, there would normally be time to systematically assess and address the aircraft emergency. Below 2,000 feet, the decision to activate the [the whole-airframe parachute system] has to come almost immediately in order to maximize the possibility of successful deployment.”

[FastEddieB]

Comment 1: "As the airplane was on final approach to runway 23, the flaps were fully extended, the airspeed varied between 91 and 99 knots, and the descent rate varied between 1,120 feet per minute and 688 feet per minute."

 

The very definition of an unstabilized approach. The SR22 calls for 80k on final, 77k for a short field. The SR22 at max gross stalls at 62k. 1.3 time that is about 80k. This pilot carried a LOT of extra speed/energy into the roundout and flare.

 

Comment 2:

 

I've seen that exact scenario play out. I was trying to get a Cirrus pilot to hold the plane off longer so as to land more slowly. I think he was fixated too far down the runway, but regardless he climbed at least 6-10 feet and I called for a go-around.

 

He applied full power and the nose began yawing to the left, away from the runway and towards trees to the left of RWY 2 at Copperhill, TN.

 

My intervention was to aggressively lower the nose and slam in the required right rudder, ground be damned. Though we lost altitude as I applied some pretty extreme corrections, we did not contact the ground. Whew!

 

That's what was needed to to avoid this outcome, IMHO.

[Doug G.]

EddieB, what I am seeing in the report is a pull up to a high AoA coupled with a dumping of the flaps without achieving a positive rate. Maybe also aggrevated by the left-turning tendencies?

I don't know the Cirrus, but I know with our CTs the first two would be enough to hit the ground hard.

[FastEddieB]

The left turning tendency is the major culprit here, IMHO. The flap situation may have confused things, but was not the proximate cause.

 

if you're used to 100hp or thereabouts, all the theoretical left turning tendencies - p-factor, torque, spiraling slipstream, gyroscopic precession*) are there, but pretty small and manageable in a go around.

 

Hang a big 310 HP engine up front, and all those effects are magnified. REALLY magnified. So much so it takes a strong right leg to overcome the yaw and incipient roll.

 

Yet many pilots will instinctively apply aileron against the roll - hey, it works 99.9% of the time - and not have the discipline to lower the nose as things go rapidly out of control.

 

Do a YouTube search for "takeoff torque roll". At first glance, the best examples are of RC planes, but it will still give you an idea of how quickly it can happen and what the results are. If you stumble upon or know of a better one, please point me towards it.

 

 

 

*gyroscopic precession comes into play with rapid pitch changes. But in a pitch UP, it would actually apply a right turning tendency, but one that would be dwarfed by all the other forces in play.

[Doug G.]

Very familiar with torque roll in RC, but both the power to weight ratio and quite often the wing shape has a great deal to do with how an RC plane reacts - many times it is desirable for aerobatics. (I have a feeling you know all this.)

I'll take your word on the Cirrus since that is well beyond my experience. For me a go around means adding power, keeping the noise low, and waiting for positive rate of climb (above Vs1) before moving the flaps.

[Ed Cesnalis]

 

This happened locally on the weekend, nice day light winds.

 

I had to laugh at this in the news story "The picture shows that the plane has damage on its nose, but there is no word on the cause of the accident just yet.". What about the tail, wing and gear?

 

Runway is 4237 x 60 @ 6,500' elevation, which is short.

 

I see flaps but I bet he landed long and fast and couldn't stop.

 

The plane is from coastal Oregon, you have to also guess it could have been a departure stall due to not leaning for high altitude take off.

 

I'll post again when I learn more.

[Ed Cesnalis]

The more I look at it the more it reminds me of this recent stall/spin on departure.

 

Nose damage plus the relationship to the runway is putting me in the departure camp. If so that would make 2 recent stall/spin departures involving fully loaded Cessnas that did not result in fatalities.

 

That thought makes me think that a high altitude departure stall/spin is less fatal because it happens from a low altitude AGL and they hit the ground before they develop maximum velocity?

 

It is also interesting that these somewhat common high altitude take off crashes due to full rich mixture will not happen in our CTs. Unlike a Lycoming or other aircraft engine the Rotax realizes something very close to max power even though it is full rich.